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This paper examines the level and sources of suppon for the market-oriented reforms 
in East-Central Europe and the relationship between these attitudes and political trust in the 
governments. The analysis is based on data collected in a common public opinion survey on 
social, economic and political justice implemented in the spring and summer of 1991 in 
eleven countries: Russia. Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany 
(east and west), Holland, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States. 
The survey results suggest some measure of caution and concern regarding the 
possibilities for a successful transition to market democracy in the former communist 
countries. In all of them. there remains a high degree of commitment to the old system of 
social welfare. and considerable distrust of the current political system and economic 
reforms. These concerns are based mostly on economic factors rather than ideological ones 
and reflect the difficulties and dislocations many people are experiencing with the economic 
transition. 
The people that are the most skeptical about the reforms, and most reluctant to let go 
of the past. are typically older. less educated, and less politically active. In some ways, 
these are the people who have been left behind ("the losers") in the economic transition, 
which is being managed and supported by those who are younger, highly educated and more 
politically active ( "the winners"). Because they have not been very active politically, they do 
not pose an immediate threat to the political system. and can therefore fairly safely be 
ignored by the new political elite. But if the economy deteriorates too sharply, or for too 
long, they are likely to be activated. 
Perhaps the biggest factor working against the new governments is time. In order for 
the reforms to be successful. the governments need either to effect a fairly rapid economic 
turnaround, thus defusing discontent. or effect a chan'.5e in popular values that will allow 
people to accept the inequality, unemployment and reduced economic security of democratic 
capitalism. Both of these tasks are likely to take a long time, perhaps as long as a 
generation. 
Some of the countries of the region have a better chance than others of making the 
successful transition. Slovenia and former Czechoslovakia, for example, exhibit relatively 
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low levels of support for socialism. high support for the market. a low sense of political 
alienation and high incidence of "post-materialist" values. Thus these countries seem better 
positioned to push ahead with market reforms while maintaining popular political support. 
Russia and Poland are at the opposite ends of almost all of these spectra. suggesting a 
rougher ride. 
This might also suggest that some countries are more suited for a rapid transition 
through "shock therapy" and others more suited to an evolutionary transition. Former 
Czechoslovakia (and especially the Czech Republic) and Slovenia may be ready to make the 
"leap to the market," sustaining large-scale but short-time difficulties for the sake of longer 
term growth and prosperity. Countries like Poland and Russia may have to settle for the 
gradualist approach. This will afford the time to build political coalitions on behalf of the 
reforms. to mollify those constituencies who feel left out, and to provide for those who will 
be most adversely affected by the reforms. This will take time. involve compromises. and 
delay economic reforms. But the costs in terms of growth and production may be offset by 
gains in social harmony and political stability. 
Attitudes Towards the Market and the State in Post-Communist Europe 
Dr. David S. Mason 
The former communist states succeeded in one revolution, with the overthrow or 
replacement of the communist pany governments. Now they are attempting another, with 
the effon to simultaneously develop democratic political institutions and capitalist economies. 
The task is a complex and difficult one, even from a strictly theoretical point of view: the 
new governments must wrestle with the details of writing constitutions, fostering interest 
groups and political parties, reforming the legal system, privatizing industry and agriculture, 
establishing a banking system. freeing prices. and many other tasks. But these technical 
problems are made much more difficult by the poiitical environment and cultural context. 
During the long and stressr'ul economic transition, these fragile new governments must elicit 
popular suppon, or at least acquiescence, for the paths they have chosen. In almost all of 
the post-communist states. this is proving to be the most difficult task of all. If these 
governments are going to succeed in their effons, they will need some degree of suppon for 
market-oriented reform, and some degree of trust from the population. Without these, the 
reforms will fail or the governments will collapse, or both. 
This paper examines the level and sources of suppon for the market-oriented reforms 
in East-Central Europe (hereafter ECE) and the relationship between these attitudes and 
political trust in the governments. The analysis is based on data collected in a common 
public opinion survey on social. economic and political justice implemented in the spring and 
summer of l 991 in eleven countries: Russia, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Germany (east and west), Holland, the United Kingdom, Japan and the 
United States. 1 The focus of this paper will be on the ECE countries (here defined as the 
first six countries listed above, plus eastern Germany), though comparisons will be made 
between them and the capitalist democratic states (western Germany, Holland, the UK, the 
US and Japan). 
In the last few years. there have been numerous public opinion surveys conducted in 
East Central Europe that have tapped attitudes towards the changes in those countries. 2 
Most of these have been single-country studies 
and most have asked questions about fairly specific aspects of the country's economic and 
political reforms. Thus they have tapped attitudes. which are more fluid, more than deep-
seated values. 3 Most of these surveys have found general suppon for the reforms, but 
considerable anxiety about the societal consequences of those reforms. The present project 
is unique in a number of respects: the size of the questionnaire (an hour-long interview, 
over 200 variables); the comparative nature of the project (eleven countries); and the 
emphasis on values involving broad considerations of social, economic and political justice. 
Attitudes Toward Market Principles 
Citizens in the post-communist states demonstrate a remarkable ambivalence toward 
the theory and practice of socialism. Having just overturned the communist system, with its 
J.uthoritarianism, centralization. and inefficiencies. most people are hostile to the ~. at 
least. of socialism. When asked about their views on socialism, fewer than a quarter of 
respondents in each of six post-communist states expressed suppon for that path, while the 
overwhelming majority in each country agreed with the statement that "a free market 
economy is essential to our economic development" (see Tables 1 and 2). Such substantial 
suppon for a new course in the economic sphere would seem to bode well for the 
transformational policies of the new governments in these countries. 
Once one gets away from the ideologically loaded terms of "socialism" and "market", 
however, this seeming consensus begins to disappear. When respondents were asked more 
specir"ic questions. they tended to support important policies and values associated with the 
state socialist regimes they have left behind. This is perhaps most evident in widespread 
egalitarianism, suppon for a strong role for the government in the economy, and deep 
skepticism about a distributive system based more on merit than on need. 
Egalitarianism 
The radical egalitarianism of early communism in the Soviet Union was soon replaced 
by a more meritocratic ideology and incentive system in the Stalin period, in both Russia and 
Eastern Europe. Nevenheless, there remained a strong egalitarianism in the communist 
ideology, and both wages and incomes were less highly differentiated in the communist 
countries than in the western capitalist ones." Surveys conducted in East Europe, and 
especially in Poland, before 1989 showed a high degree of social and economic 
egalitarianism in the populations. 5 
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As the ECE countries move toward free enterprise and the market, economic 
inequality will grow sharply as the governments relax restrictions on wages and wealth and 
abandon their commitment to full employment. A major task of the new governments is to 
convince their populations to accept greater economic inequality in the society. This may be 
difficult, given the prevailing attitudes. When asked about the differences in incomes people 
have in their countries, the overwhelming majority in each of the ECE states assert that such 
differences are too large. These feelings are particularly strong in Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Slovenia where 60% or more think that income differences are much too large. Preferred 
income differences are much less in the post-communist states than in the developed capitalist 
countries. Respondents in the survey were asked to postulate a "just and fair" income for the 
managing director of a large corporation and for an unskilled factory worker. In the six 
post-communist states (including eastern Germany), the average ratios between these two 
salaries (the first divided by the second) were uniformly smaller than in the capitalist states. 
The median postulated income differential in the capitalist states was 4.0 (the higher income 
should be 4 times larger than the smaller), compared to just 2.5 in the post-communist ones. 
While most people do not favor total income equality, many do. When asked about 
the fairest way of distributing wealth and income, 20-30% favored giving everyone equal 
shares. These figures may seem high for such a radically egalitarian position, but the level 
of support for this position was similar to that of the capitalist states. What the ECE 
populations do favor is guaranteed jobs and, to a lesser extent, ceilings on income, imposed 
by the government: a solution not too different than that which prevailed under the 
communist regimes. The preference for guaranteed jobs is overwhelming with from 62 % 
(Czechoslovakia) to 84% (eastern Germany) strongly agreeing that "the government should 
provide a job for everyone who wants one." Smaller but still sizeable percentages in each 
country agree (strongly or somewhat) that "the government should place an upper limit on 
the amount of money any one person can make." Support for this latter position is strongest 
in Slovenia (60%), east Germany (60%) and Hungary (58%), but considerable in the other 
states as well: Poland (47%), Bulgaria (42%), Russia (34%) and Czechoslovakia (30%). As 
we will see below, this reflects a strong preference in the ECE states for governmental 
solutions to economic and social problems in the region. 
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Need vs. Merit 
This strand of economic egalitarianism is linked to a popular conception of justice that 
calls for rewards to be distributed on the basis of need as much as (or more than) merit or 
desen. This seems to be at least partly a legacy of the communist period, when the state 
guaranteed jobs and provided a whole host of entitlements, including national minimum 
wages and retirement benefits. heavy subsidies of food, housing, utilities and vacations, 
generous maternity leaves and so on. While many East Europeans complained about 
shortages of consumer goods and a standard of living lower than that in the West. they also 
became accustomed to these benefits provided by the state. 
This concern about peoples' needs is indicated by substantial agreement with the 
proposition that "people [should] get what they need. even if this means allocating money 
from those who have earned more than they need." As seen in Table 3, a majority or a 
plurality of respondents in all the ECE countries (except Bulgaria) agreed (strongly or 
somewhat) with this proposition. Lower income people are somewhat more likely to agree 
with this statement. but support for the principle remains substantial across income groups in 
most cases. In Poland, for example, 66% of respondents in the bottom income quartile 
agree. but so do 48% of those in the top quartile. (Below. we will investigate in more detail 
the sources of suppon for this and other "socialist" principles). 
This emphasis on need over merit is also evident in another question on which of a 
number of factors should influence the level of pay for an employee. When asked about "the 
size of the family the employee supports," a clear major of respondents in every ECE 
country except Czechoslovakia felt that this should have "a great deal" or "some" influence 
in determining salary. The average level of support for this proposition was 57% in the ECE 
countries, compared to 48 % in the developed capitalist countries. The highest level of 
support for this proposition, however, came from western Germany (73%). As we will see 
elsewhere, attitudes and values in the ECE countries often are closer to those in western 
Germany, with its "social market" system, than to the other capitalist states. 6 
The Role of the State 
With their revolutions, the ECE countries left behind systems in which the state and 
party dominated the economy and most other aspects of society. The state provided jobs and 
housing, set prices and wages, owned industries, schools and farms (in most countries), and 
subsidized basic necessities. The omnipresence and omnipotence of the state aggravated 
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many people, and contributed to the revolutionary ferment. But many people also came to 
rely on the benefits provided by the state. Under the communist systems, the people may not 
have had freedom or affluence, but they did have basic economic security. The current 
reforms promise to deliver the former, but threaten the latter. 
Our survey asked three main questions on the role of the government in the economy: 
whether the government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living, place 
upper limits on income, and provide a job for everyone who wants one. On all three 
questions. there was strong support in all of the ECE countries, and for the issues of 
guaranteed jobs and standard of living, it was almost universal (see Table 4). As is evident 
from the table, there was substantial support for these principles from the capitalist countries 
as well. But respondents in the ECE countries were, overall, much more supportive of this 
strong government role than were those in the western countries. When responses to these 
three questions were averaged at the individual level, and then by country, support for 
statism was strongest in eastern Germany, followed in order by Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Russia, Japan. Czechoslovakia, west Germany, the UK, Holland, and the U.S. 
Americans. indeed. were much less supportive of strong government than any other country 
in this sample (see Figure 1 ). 
Su1mort for principles of socialism: summary measures 
On all three principles, equality, need, and role of the state, East Central Europeans 
generally lean toward a more egalitarian and statist system than do those in West Europe, 
Japan or the United States. To make more systematic cross-national comparisons, and to 
allow a more systematic examination of the determinants of these attitudes, a single summary 
measure of pro-socialist orientations was derived from nine attitudinal questions from the 
survey including the questions above tapping attitudes toward equality, need and the 
government role in the economy. The average scores on this index, by country, are 
indicated in Figure 2. The absolute value of this index is not in itself very meaningful. 
What is notable here is the ranking of the countries. As before, the ECE countries generally 
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score higher in socialist orientations than do the capitalist countries. The division between 
the two groups is not completely firm however. with west Germany, Russia. Japan and 
Czechoslovakia together in a middle group. Thus there seem to be three groupings, with the 
other ECE countries in the top group and the UK, Holland and the United States in the 
bottom (less pro-socialist) group. As we have seen before, the United States is a distant 
outlier on this scale. Values and attitudes in the ECE countries are much closer to those in 
west Europe (especially Germany) and Japan than they are to those in the U.S. If this is the 
case, the west European and Japanese models of economic and social development, involving 
a greater emphasis on community and government activism. might be more appropriate for 
the ECE states than the more individualistic and laissez-faire approach in the United States. 
For and Against Reform: determinants of attitudes 
So far we have looked only at national averages of attitudes toward issues relevant to 
the economic reforms. But in assessing the likely success of the market-oriented reforms in 
ECE, it is necessary to look at who it is that supports and opposes these reforms. It would 
be helpful for the market-oriented governments. of course, if a majority of the population 
supported the kinds of policies they are implementing. As we have seen above, however. 
that is not likely to be the case. Most people in these countries still have a basically 
egalitarian and statist orientation that works against the laissez-faire and decentralizing 
reforms being implemented or contemplated in each of the post-communist states. But even 
in the absence of a consensus behind the reforms. the governments might be able to push 
through the reforms if the proponents of the reforms remained politically active and the 
opponents were not. 
In each of the ECE countries, the strongest determinant by far of pro-socialist 
attitudes is education (see Table 5). In most countries, income and sex are the next most 
important. Those with low education and incomes, and women, are more supportive of 
socialist principles than others. As is evident from Figure 3, there is a steady decline in 
support for socialist principles from those with low education to those with higher 
educations. Among those at the lowest educational levels, over half score in the highest third 
of the pro-socialism index, and onlv 15 % score low in that index. The percentages are 
almost exactly reversed for those at the highest income levels. (Across all of the ECE 
countries. the correlation coeificient between the socialism index and educational level is 
.34). 
The strong relationship between education and support for socialism is not surprising 
and, in fact, prevails in the western countries as well (r=.19). In the ECE countries, 
however, it is particularly strong and reflects a real and perplexing division within those 
societies. The governments of these countries are pursuing non-egalitarian reforms and are 
supported in that effort by the more highly educated minority in those societies who, as it 
happens. also have the most to gain from s.uch reforms. 
Indeed. in many of these countries. the new governments are dominated by the highly 
educated. as the revolutions swept into power intellectuals who had previousiy opposed the 
communist system. 
In the ECE countries as elsewhere. education is related to income, so support for 
socialist principles is also related to income in those countries (r= .29). In Poland, for 
example, 4 7 % of those in the bottom quartile of family incomes score high in support of 
socialist principles, while among those in the upper quartile, only 17% do. Thus we see 
what could be a politically dangerous situation in the ECE countries, where the governments 
and a relatively small educated elite favor the implementation of a market-based economy 
and more meritocratic society. while most of the poor and less-educated population. who will 
most directly feel the bite oi these reforms. remain supponive of many oi the social and 
economic principles of the old regimes. While almost everyone seems committed to the 
democratic aspects of the reform process, there are sha.rp divisions over the economic ones. 
Economic Values and Political Participation 
It may seem paradoxical that there should be such divisions between leaders and led 
in societies that have just undergone paroxysms of revolution, participation. and 
democratization. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, hundreds of thousands of 
people participated in demonstrations that brought down the communist governments, and 




But on closer examination. it is clear that political activity in ECE remained limited, 
even during the revolutionary ferment. Most people in all countries voted in the early 
elections. but were not otherwise active politically in even a minimal way. Our survey asked 
respondents if they had ever participated in any of ten variants of political action, ranging 
from writing a newspaper or signing a petition to joining a wildcat strike or blocking traffic 
(all questions used in the Political Action study). 7 As Table 6 and Figure 4 show, there is 
wide variation across countries here. with the incidence of protest high in those countries 
where the governments were brought down by people power (East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria) and low in those where the transition was more evolutionary 
( Poland) or managed by the political elite (Hungary). But what is remarkable here is the 
lack of political activity of any kind in most of the countries: in four of the seven countries, 
two-thirds or more of the respondents had engaged in ~ of the ten forms of protest 
activity. 
Those people who were more active tended to be less supportive of socialist 
principles. In every ECE country, the level of support for socialist principles declines as the 
level of political activity increases (see Figure 5). This supports the evidence above that the 
more politically active and involved are more committed to the market-oriented reforms than 
the less active. 
There is both good news and bad news in this for the reforming governments in ECE. 
The good news is that the people opposed to or skeptical about the market-oriented reforms 
are not likely to express this opposition in political action. There is a kind of "silent 
majority" in the ECE countries of people who are not committed to the reforms. but will not 
speak out or vote against them, thus allowing the reformist governments to pursue the 
difficult transitional policies without substantial opposition. So far, at least, there have been 
few political parties or organizations in the ECE countries which have attempted to mobilize 
this potential opposition. In part this is due to lingering resentment of the communists, and a 
popular suspicion that organized groups that oppose the liberalizing reforms must be 
communists. Indeed, there are still communist or proto-communist groups or parties in each 
of these countries, but these are quite small. As we have seen here, potential opposition to 
the reforms is much broader and deeper in the population than is suppon for these groups. 
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The bad news for the reforming governments is the possibility that this opposition to 
the reforms ~ become mobilized and politically active. The silent majority can be safely 
ignored as long as it stays silent. But if the transitional period becomes too painful or too 
long, the skepticism about the principles of the reform will be reinforced by very real 
economic hardship. The combination of these circumstances could very well lead to popular 
upheaval (e.g. strikes or demonstrations) or simply to electoral defeat for the reforming 
governments and the accession to power of governments committed to reversing the tide of 
marketization, or even of democratization. 
Political Alienation and Disaffection 
The level of poiiticai disaffection and alienation is surprisingly high in the ECE 
countries, given that they had so recently emerged from communism and established 
fledgling democratic governments. One would expect there to be a cenain "honeymoon" for 
the new governments, with popular trust and expectations high, at least for the political 
systems. But the post-communist societies have even higher levels of political distrust and 
alienation than the established democratic ones. Responding to a standard question on how 
often the national government is run for the benetit of all of the people, between 20% and 
..\.4% in the ECE countries said "rarely" or "never", figures comparable to or even higher 
than most western countries 1see Table 7). An index of political alienation. made up of the 
means of this question and three others measuring personal and governmental efficacy, shows 
similar results. with political alienation highest in Hungary, Japan, Russia and Poland and 
lowest in Holland, Slovenia and Czechoslovakia (see Figure 6). For the more stable and 
long-standing democracies like Japan and the UK (where disaffection is also high), such 
attitudes may not be particularly dangerous, and may simply mean trouble for the existing 
government or ruling party. In the fledgling democracies, high levels of distrust make it 
harder for the government to accomplish big changes, and may even threaten the permanence 
of democratic institutions. 
What accounts for the high levels of distrust of government in the new ECE 
countries? In the West. most studies have shown that trust in government and voting 
patterns are based more on people's assessment of the national situation rather than their own 
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personal financial one. Thus political support is more "sociotropic" than it is egocentric. 3 
In the ECE countries, this also seems to be the case. While our survey asked few questions 
about the future, one question did ask for the respondent's assessment of whether over the 
next five years, the percentage of poor people in their country would increase or decrease. 
In all of the ECE countries, a majority of the respondents (from 62 % in east Germany to 
89 % in Russia) thought poverty would increase. This variable turns out to be a strong 
predictor of political disaffection, in most countries more so than age, education, income or 
the level of individual satisfaction with one's income or life (see Table 8). As is apparent 
from that table, these "egocentric" factors do play a role, but not as strong as the 
,, sociotropic" factor of expectations that poverty will increase. It should be noted that family 
income. which was included in this regression analysis, did not have a statistically significant 
role in filll of the seven countries. 
This again points to the economic bases of political support and legitimacy in these 
countries and the close ties between economic and political stability. Economic concerns, 
whether they be macro-level (concern over growth of poverty) or micro-level (concern over 
one's own standard of living), loom large in the explanation of political satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction. This is also consistent with our finding that many people continue to cling to 
the social and economic safety-nets that were provided by the socialist systems. 
The Politics of Economic Reform: Reshaping Culture and Ideology 
The evidence above points to the deep social and political obstacles to the transition to 
market democracies in East-Central Europe. It is unlikely that the governments of the region 
will be able to work against this political culture; either the governments will have to change 
or the culture will. Given the overwhelming consensus among both the ECE political elites 
and Western financial institutions that they should push ahead with the reforms, the 
governments will not lightly change their market-oriented strategies. What they need to do, 
in that case, is to work on reshaping popular values and political culture. As Kent Jennings 
points out, "if we want to change perceptions of unfairness, one fundamental route is to 
change value systems first--no small task. "9 
This is normally the task of the political socialization process, which often takes a 
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generation or more to effect substantial changes in values or culture. But in ECE, the 
political culture seems particularly fluid and malleable in this transitional period, so perhaps 
these governments will be able to bring the populations around to their point of view more 
quickly. 
Ideology and Value Inconsistenc): 
This is particularly true in terms of ideology. As we have seen above, citizens of 
ECE are remarkably nonideological in their orientations. As seen in Table 1, in all of the 
ECE countries except Bulgaria, the most fre!J_uent reaction to socialism is "neither for nor 
against." Much of the opposition to socialism seems to be to the political aspects of the 
communist system rather than to the socialist aspects of the ideology. For example, even 
among those who professed to be "totally agrunst" socialism roughly 20-25 % in each country 
also scored high on our index of support for socialist principles. 
Even during the communist period, the formal ideology of communism never took 
hold very well in any country, even after years of socialization. Studies of both the Soviet 
Union and Poland 10, for example, showed how shallow was the commitment to Marxism-
Leninism and, indeed, how little real knowledge most people had of basic ideological 
principles. Of course political knowledge and ideological commitment is also weak in the 
United States and other western countries. 11 But in the communist states. where political 
socialization was so much more uniform. centralized. and intense. it was somewhat 
surprising how little the ideological principles had taken hold. 
In the present environment, the post-communist states are also in a kind of post-
ideological limbo. The old ideology has been rejected, but a new one has not yet taken hold. 
Even the "left-right" and "conservative-liberal" political distinctions, which are fairly well 
understood in the capitalist countries, have been set loose from their bearings in the post-
communist states. In Russia, for example, a "conservative" is thought of as one who is more 
sympathetic to the old (communist) order than to the new (capitalist) reforms. Our survey 
asked respondents to identify themselves on a 10-point scale of left to right. In the capitalist 
countries, this variable was positively correlated with our socialism index (r= .19). In the 
ECE countries overall, the correlation was substantially weaker (.07) and in Russia, the 
correlation was negative (-.11) meaning that people who identified themselves on the "right" 
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were more likely to suppon the socialist principles than were those on the left. Thus the 
traditional notions of left and right have been thoroughly scrambled. 
This seems to be due, in pan, to the tendency of much of the post-communist 
populations to favor QQlb. capitalism and socialism; to achieve the higher standard of living of 
the former without relinquishing the economic security of the latter. Thus, respondents in 
the ECE countries overwhelmingly believe that the individual's level of pay should be based 
primarily on his/her individual effort (over 90% in all countries), but a majority in each 
country also believes that such pay should be based on the size of the family the employee 
suppons. On many important issues. most people hold what appear to be mutually 
contradictory views. Two questions. for example, tap different sides of the merit vs. need 
criteria: 1) people are entitled to keep what they have earned--even if this means some 
people will be wealthier than others: and 2) the most important thing is that people get what 
they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they 
need. On these two questions, from 34 % (Bulgaria) to 86 % ( east Germany) agreed with 
both propositions, and 20% or more in each country stron~ly agreed with both propositions. 
Of course, such inconsistency is also characteristic of western populations, but in our 
survey it is much stronger in the ECE countries than the others. One would expect. for 
example. a negative correlation between these two variables. That is the case in most 
countries. but the correlation is much weaker in most of the ECE countries (-.06 to -.09) 
than in the western ones (-.10 to -.21 ); becomes statistically insignificant in some (Bulgaria); 
and actually turns positive in east Germany. 
What stands out in all of this is the prevalence of hard economic issues. At this 
point, most of the citizens of ECE seem less interested in either ideology or politics, and 
more interested in their own economic fate and that of their country. They favor liberalizing 
economic reforms, if that will bring them a better standard of living. But they are reluctant 
to change a system that will mean less security and more inequality. 
The predominance of these economic concerns is apparent from the survey questions 
tapping "materialism" and "post-materialism." Using the standard 4-item index 12, we asked 
respondents to rank "four possible political goals": maintain order in the country, give people 
more say in the decisions of government, fight rising prices, and protect freedom of speech. 
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The first and third of these are considered "materialist" values; the second and founh, "post-
materialist" ones. People who ranked the materialist values in both first and second place 
are considered "pure materialists"; the same for the post-materialist values. Others are 
considered "mixed. " 
As shown in Figure 7, materialist values predominate over post-materialist ones in all 
of the ECE countries. Only in east Germany, which had already been brought under the 
protective social system of west Germany, were materialist values as low as in the capitalist 
states. As Ron Inglehart and others have suggested, these values are closely related to the 
standard of living, and economic security in each country. Thus, as the standard of living 
improved in a country, one would see increased incidence of post-materialist values over 
time. As a country's economy improves. each succeeding generation should demonstrate a 
higher incidence of post-materialism. Indeed, in this survey, as in surveys analyzed by 
Inglehart, post-materialism declines with age in every country. 
On the other hand, our results seem to contradict Inglehart's assumption that such 
values reflect inter-generational change and the standard of living experienced by people a 
generation earlier. If this were the case, one would expect a higher incidence of post-
materialism in these countries now than ten years earlier. But in most of the ECE countries 
the percent of post-materialists is very low indeed, and almost non-existent in Poland, for 
example. Inglehan reports a survey conducted in Poland in 1980 in which from 10-20% of 
the respondents were classified as post-materialists, depending on age. 13 Our survey shows 
only 1-5% as post-materialists. Surely this difference reflects the calamitous state of the 
Polish economy at present rather than any dramatic decline in the standard of living a 
generation earlier. 14 
Implications for Economic Reform and Political Stability 
These survey results suggest some measure of caution and concern regarding the 
possibilities of a successful transition to market democracy in the former communist 
countries. In all of these countries, there remains a high degree of commitment to the old 
system of social welfare, and considerable distrust of the current political system and 
economic reforms. These concerns are based mostly on economic factors rather than 
15 
roles throughout the region. But, as Apter pointed out, social science does not perform well 
the functions of identity and solidarity, which ideology does. and in such situations "recourse 
will be had to ideology in its most dogmatic forms" as people search for such identity and 
solidarity. 17 This is also a potentially dangerous scenario for much of East Central Europe. 
As economic conditions decline, people become frustrated, and the formerly unifying 
institutions and ideals disappear, people may search for scapegoats and drift toward radical 
political movements. Such phenomena are already growing in the region with the emergence 
of anti-Semitism and virulent and sometimes violent nationalism--with Serbs and Bosnians, 
Czechs and Slovaks. Estonians and Russians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis blaming each other 
for past and present economic woes and other grievances. 
Some of the countries oi the region have a better chance than others of making the 
successful transition. Slovenia and Czechoslovakia, for example, exhibit relatively low levels 
of support for socialism, high suppon for the market, a low sense of political alienation and 
high incidence of "post-materialist" values. Thus these countries seem better positioned to 
push ahead with market reforms while maintaining popular political support. Russia and 
Poland are at the opposite ends of almost all of these spectra, suggesting a rougher ride. 
This might also suggest that some countries are more suited for a rapid transition 
through "shock therapy" and others more suited to an evolutionary transition. 
Czechoslovakia and Slovenia. with higher degrees of political support and market-oriented 
values, may be ready to make the "Ieap to the market," sustaining large-scale but short-time 
difficulties for the sake of longer term growth and prosperity. Countries like Poland and 
Russia, without either the political suppon or the value orientations, may have to settle for 
the gradualist approach. This will afford the time to build political coalitions on behalf of 
the reforms, to mollify those constituencies who feel 1.eft out, and to provide for those who 
will be most adversely affected by the reforms. Such consensus- and coalition-building will 
take time, and will involve compromises. Thus the reforms may have to be delayed. But 




1. This study is part of the International Social Justice Project (ISJP), in which national teams in each of the 
eleven countries was responsible for obtaining a probability sample of the adult population, the cross-validation 
of the measuring instrument, and the implementation of a national survey in which a target sample of 1500 
respondents was to be obtained. More detailed information can be found in the documentation of the study, 
International Socia) Justice Project: Codebook and Documentation (Institute for Social Research, University of 
Michigan, May 1992). 
This project was supported in part by a grant from the National Council for Soviet and East European 
Research. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, November 1992. 
~ote: The data reported in this paper are preliminary, though no substantial differences are 
expected when the tinaJ dataset is available. 
,, For example, Robert D. Grey, Lauri A. Jcnnish and A.S. Tyler, "Soviet Public Opinion and the Gorbachev 
Reforms", Slavic Review 49, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 261-71; David Mason and Svetlana Sydorenko, 
"Perestroyka, Social Justice, and Soviet Public Opinion." Problems of Communism 39, no. 6 (November-
December 1990):34-43; Robert Shiller. Maxim Boycko and Vladimir Korobov, "Popular Attitudes Towards 
Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," unpublished ms, 1990; Ada Finifter and 
Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Suppon for Political Change," Paper 
presented at APSA, San Francisco. 1990; Lynn D. Nelson, Lilia V. Babaeva and Rufat 0. Babaev, 
• Perspectives on Entrepreneurship and Privatization in Russia: Policy and Public Opinion." Slavic Review 51 
(Summer 1992): 271-286; James L. Gibson. Raymond M. Duch and Kent L. Tedin, "Democratic Values and 
the Transformation of the Soviet Union." The Journal of Politics 54, no. 2 (May 1992): 329-371. 
3. Values may be defined as "any relatively stable. individual-level predisposition to accept or reject particular 
types of arguments.• Opinions are "a marriage of information and values.• John Zaller, "Information. Values 
and Opinion.• American Political Science Review 85. no. 4 (1991): 1215-16. 
-4. See for example Abram Bergson. Plannirn.! am.I Performance in Socialist Economies: The USSR and Eastern 
Europe (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
5. For data on Poland, see David S. Mason, Puhlic Opinion and Political Change in Poland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 62-6. 
6. In another survey in which people in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia were asked what son of society 
they would like their country to emulate. the majority named Germany or Sweden. The U.S. ranked third, with 
an average of 18%. Richard Rose, nToward a Civil Economy," Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 (April 1992): 
16. 
7. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies 
( Beverly HiJls: Sage, 1979). 
8. See, for example, Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, "Public Reactions to Economic Perfonnance and 
Political Support in Contemporary Liberal Democracies: The Case of Canada•, in H.D. Clarke, M.C. Stewart 
and G. Zuk, eds., Economic Decline and Political Change (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 
pp. 255-6; D.R. Kiewiet, Macroeconomics and Micropolitjcs (University of Chicago, 1983); Euel Elliott and 
Rose-Marie Zuk, "The Structure of Public Economic Evaluations: The United States, 1976-84•, in Clarke, 
Stewan and Zuk. Economic D~dine, pp. i 73-5. 
?. M. Kent Jennings, 'Thinking aouut Social Injusuce. • Political Psvcholo!!V 12. no. 2 (1991): 199. 
~0. Vladimir Shlapento.kh. Soviet Puhlic Opinion and Ideology tNew York: Praeger, 1986): ~1ason. 1!w?li£ 
Opinion and Political Change in ?olamL 
17 
; l. Donaid Kinder anci David Sears. ··Public Opinion and Political Action,• in Gardner Lindz.ey and Elliot 
Aronson, eds .. The Handbook of Social Psvchology. vol 2 (Reading, .Mass: Addison-Wesley 1985), p. 665; 
Philip Converse. "The Nature or Belief Systems in Mass Publics.· in David Apter. ed .. Ideology and Discontent 
1 New York: Free Press. 1964). 
12. Ronald Inglehan. "Value Priorities and Socioeconorruc Change,· in Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase. 
Political Action: Mass Participa11on in Five Western Democracies tBeveriy Hills: Sage, 1979), p. 330. 
'.3. Ronald lnglehart. Culture Shift in AJvanceu lnc.Juscnal Societv I Princeton: Princeton Universny Press. 
• )90), p. 442. 
i-1. Harold Clarke. in exarrumng the lnglehan studies and the Eurobarometer studies. found that the post• 
matenaHsm index was very sensitive to short-term changes in economic conditions and that economic adversity 
Jid cause a decline in postmaterialists. "~,1easuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The 
[mpact of Unempioyment." .. ~mencan Political Science Review 85. no. 3 (September 1991): 905. 
15. Samuel Huntington argues that the lack of c.Jemocratic experience and the uncertainty of economic sua:ess 
s;ast doubt on the ultimate success oi many of these democratic conversions ("Democracy's Third Wave,• 
Journal of Democracv 2 (Spring 1991): 1:2-34). Similarly. T.R. Gurr points out that there 1s no systematic 
evidence that the introduction of c.lemocracy ts likely to lead to burgeoning economic growth. T.R. Gurr, 
• Amenca as a Model for the Worlc.l? A Skepllcal View,·· PS: Political Science 24. no. 4 (December 1991): 
664-5. 
I 6. s~. for example. Philippe .::ichmt1ter. 'The Cunsoildation of Political Democracy m Southern Europe" 
unpuolished manuscnot. I 988): anu an overview or the theory ot democratic trans1t1ons m David Mason, 
~cvoiutwn m East-Centrai Europe ,_ \Ves1v1cw. rorthcorrung Septemoer i 992). chapter 4. 
I 7. David Apter. Ideolol!v anc.J Disconrenl t I 964), p. 26. 
country 
Table l 












Bulgaria 8.1 16.l 24.2 19.2 32.4 
Czechoslovakia 2.4 12.4 34.8 24.l 26.3 
East Germany 1.6 16.6 39.2 27.6 14.9 
?eland 1.8 9,2 43.2 20.2 25,7 
Russia 9.6 17.0 29.7 21.4 22.2 
Slovenia 2.4 12.4 34.8 24.l 26.3 
Question: ?eople have different views about socialism. Based on your 
experience in (country name) of socialism, would you say that you are very 
much in favor, somewhat in favor, neither for nor againsit, somewhat against, 
or totally against socialism? 
':'able 2 
Support for a Market Economy 














Bulgaria 44.0 24.7 14.1 10.7 6.6 
Czechoslovakia 51.8 31.1 11.9 4.0 1.3 
Poland 26.5 46.0 15.3 8.0 4.1 
Russia 36.0 34.5 9.2 11.3 9.0 
Slovenia 73.7 :zo. 7 4.3 :.o 0.3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Question: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: A free market economy is essential to our economic development. 
Table 3 
People Should Get What They Need 
(% of respondents) 
20 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Eastern Germany 85.3 7.0 7.6 996 
Western Germany 76.6 11.4 12. 0 1801 
Poland 55.8 21.5 22.6 1404 
Slovenia 54.7 10.2 35.1 1321 
UK 49.0 15.7 35.3 1258 
rl.ussia 46.9 10.8 42.4 1524 
USA 45.5 7.0 47.6 1375 
Holland 45.0 20.7 34.4 794 
Czechoslovakia 44.8 22.8 32.4 1145 
Bulgaria 34.4 13.5 52.1 1288 
Japan 33.0 28.4 38.S 693 
Question: The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if 
this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need. 
Table 4 
Supper~ for A Strong Role for the Government in the Economy 












Bulgaria 93 42 87 
Eastern Germany 94 60 96 
Western Germany 85 32 71 
:iungary 90 58 87 
Japan 83 36 86 
Holland 86 32 53 
Poland 87 47 88 
UK 83 39 67 
USA 56 17 so 
Russia 88 34 96 
Slovenia 92 60 88 
Czechoslovakia 88 30 82 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions: Five point agree-disagree scale on following statements: l) the 
government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living; 2) the 
government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person 
can make; 3) the government should provide a job for everyone who wants one. 
Country 
Table 5 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Index of Socidlist Values 
(standardized regression coefficients--beta) 






Bulgaria -.12*** -.09** .11*** -.11*** .05 .16 
E. Germany -.13*** -.09* .05 .07* .10** .07 
Hungary -.39*** -.14*** .07* .02 .01 .24 
Poland -.36*** -.]3••· .09*** -.09•·· .OD .24 
Russia -.19*** -.11••· .10*** .OD .07* .09 
Slovenia -.30*** -.10•• .07* -.04 .03 .15 
Czechoslovakia -.28*** -.07* .09** .05 .12*** .16 
Variables: Education (based on Casmin categories); Income: family income in 20-tiles; sex; social 




p < .05 
p < .01 
p < .001 










?olitical Action by Country 
(% in each country reporting pr0teat activities ► 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Country Number of Protest Activities 
None 1-3 4-10 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
Eastern Germany 17 66 17 
Czechoslovakia 34 49 17 
Bulgaria 48 43 9 
Slovenia 66 29 s 
Russia 67 29 4 
Poland 72 23 s 
Hungary 84 15 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7 
Is National Governmen~ Run For Benefit of All? 
(% responses by country) 
24 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Bulgaria 34 35 32 
E Germany 30 so 20 
w Germany 31 47 22 
Japan 18 28 54 
ciollana 48 45 8 
?eland 22 33 45 
UK 20 37 43 
us 29 52 19 
Russia 23 36 41 
Slovenia 41 38 21 
Czechoslovakia 30 43 27 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ques~ion: How much of the time do you think the (federal) government in 




Multiple Regression Analysis of Political Alienation Index 











Slovak -.20••· -.14*** .16*** - . 10* * -.07* -.09** 
Slovenia -.19*** -.10*** .09** -.18*** -.00 -.06* 
Russia -.11*** -.06 -.03 -.07 -.07* .]2*** 
Poland -.18*** -.17*** .02 -.11*** -.08** -.08** 
Hungary -.15*** -.17*** .02 -.OB* -.11** .05 
E Germany -.12*** -.04 .17*** -.18*** .05 -.11** 
Bulgaria -.01* -.10*** .02 -.OB* -.19*** -.06* 
Questions: Future poverty--will ~ of poor increase? (vl49) 
Life and income eatlsfaction--how satisfied with life/income (v205,v202) 




p < .05 
p < .01 
Education (vl27); Age (VB). 
Social class--self identified social standing (V274). 
p < .001 










3upport for Strong Govt Role in Economy 
by Country 
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' EG, Hu SI Bu , Po Ru Ja CS ·wG. UK. Ne , US 
Country 
~ote: The statism index is the mean score on the three questicns in Table 4, 
at the individual level, averaged by country. T~e higher the number, the 
strcnger the supper,: for the statist principles. 
:::s 
Figura 2 
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2.2 EG SI Po, Bu. Hu ·wG· Ru. Ja • CS. UK. Ne. US 
Countrv 
Note: Highest numbers indicate strongest support for socialist principle■• 
Index is baaed on the average of the reaponsaa on 4- and !-pcint Likart·acalaa 
in nine queationa tapping support for socialist principles: 
·rl8S--level cf pay for an employee should be based on "the size of th.a fam.i.ly 
<:he employee supp0r1:s". 
·,•196--·•tha government should guarantee everyone a minimum s-candard cf living• 
7197--"the government:: should place an upper limit on the ainount cf money any 
one person can ma.Jul" 
vl98-"Tha government should provide a job for everyone who wants ona." 
v252--"The fairest way of distril:luting wealth and income would be to give 
everyone equal shares" 
v257--"Tha moat important thing is that people gat what they need, even if 
this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need• 
v268--Hospital scenario: "the patient suppcrti.ng the largest family is treated 
first. 
v272--Apl.l:"tmllnt scenario: "the employee with tha loweat ini:oma gets tha 
aputment" 
v27J--Apart:ment scenario: "the employee suppoJ."C.ing tha largeat fami.l.y gata 
the apa.:,:-=nent. 
Using the SPSS "Reliability" procedures, this measure produced a reliabil.i~y 
c0afficiant (Cron.bach's Alpha) of .69. Tha index waa created by avaraqinq the 
z scores of th••• nine variable• (since ■cme of tha qua■tion■ uaad fin-poJ.nt 
scales and soma cf them 4-pcint) and then subtracting :hat number from 3 in 
order to return the index to the five-poin: scale 0f moat of the quet11:i0u. 
overall, the differences among thaaa mean■ ara aignficant at tha .001 l~vel 
(F~271). Pa.lrwiae differences are signi.fii:ant at the .Ol level {Si:haffe 






























Support for Socialist Principles 
By Educational Level 
a.IC= 
Higher tertiary less than primary 
Level of Education 
, ~ High Support ------------- • • -··-· ~ ........ --•·----1111 Medium Support ~ Low Support 
Figure 4 
Political Action by Country 







































Support for Socialism 
by Level of Political Activity 
Bu EG Hu Po Ru SI cs 
Country 



















Ranked by Country 
Hu • Ja • Au • Po UK WG Bu US EG. CS • SI Na 
Country 
!lcte: :'!:.a highe:- the index. ::!'1a higher t::ha aliena-cicn. ':!'la Aliena-cicn index. 
calcula:ea at: the individual lavel, is the mean response on four f~va-point 
scaied questions: ~) pui:>lic officials dcn•t care much what people like me 
~hink cserongly agra■•-~erongly disagree~(v242); 2) in elections in en1s 
==unt::r"!, vo~ers hava a real choice (s~rongly disagree-~~r0ngly agree1(v243); 
:: '; ::cw mucn cf tha t:::.me de you -ch.ink you can -c::-.:src -c~e ( faclaral) govarmnane 
:.::. 1 capit::al ci"Cy) to do what: .i.s r:.ght:? (never--•,ery often) (v245); anci 4) How 
~ucn o: t!'1e t::ime do you -cnink t::he (federal) government in (capit::al city) is 
:-;,1n fer et.a .benatit of all t!le people7 cnaver-•re::y otten) (v246}. 
Between coun-cry diffarenc■s are overall significan~ at the .COl level (F•l42). 
3etween i~dividual coun~ries, dilferences of .:s or more ara significant ae 




Materialists and Post-Materialists 


























Po Ru Bu SI CS Ja Ne UK 
Country 
• - Materialists - Post-Materialists 
Note: Matarialists and post-materialists includa cnly those who were •pure•, 
salacting materialist (or peat-materialist) valuaa as am.a, tha mo■t impoftant 
and second moat impon:an-c valuaa. 
The question raada as followar I will read a list of four poaaible poli:ical 
goals. Suppc:,■a you had to choo■a among thaae. Which wculd .be moat important 
to ycu? And what would be the second moat important? l. Ma.inta.in orclar in 
the country7 2. give paopla mora say in the deciaiona of go,,.rnment1 3. fight 
rising price■, 3. protect :freedom of spaac:b. 
